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abstract. The current book chapter examines how to apply Dung’s
theory of abstract argumentation to define meaningful forms of non-
monotonic inference. The idea is that arguments are constructed us-
ing strict and defeasible inference rules, and that it is then examined
how these arguments attack (or defeat) each other. The thus defined
argumentation framework provides the basis for applying Dung-style se-
mantics, yielding a number of extensions of arguments. As each of the
constructed arguments has a conclusion, an extension of arguments has
an associated extension of conclusions. It are these extensions of conclu-
sions that we are interested in. In particular, we ask ourselves whether
each of these extensions is (1) consistent, (2) closed under the strict in-
ference rules and (3) free from undesired interference. We examine the
current generation of techniques to satisfy these properties, and identify
some research issues that are yet to be dealt with.
1 Introduction
Argumentation, as it takes place in everyday life, is never completely abstract.
Commonly, arguments are exchanged in order to determine what to do or what
to believe. These arguments tend to be composed of reasons, some of which
are strict and some of which are defeasible. Strict reasons (like rules of logic)
provide conclusive evidence for a claim (like “Socrates is a man. All men are
mortal. Therefore, Socrates is mortal.”) whereas defeasible reasons (like rules
of thumb) provide evidence for their claim that is only valid in the absence of
counter evidence (like “Tux is a bird. Therefore Tux can fly.”). The existence
of defeasible reasons illustrates that for commonsense reasoning, classical logic
is often not sufficient, and that some form of nonmonotonic reasoning (as for
instance provided by formal argumentation theory) is necessary.
Whereas defeasible reasons (formally represented as defeasible rules) pro-
vide a basis for nonmonotonic reasoning, strict reasons (formally represented
as strict rules) provide the ability to model hard constraints (like “given our
budget, if we acquire both product X and Y, then we cannot acquire prod-
uct Z anymore”). By doing so, strict rules provide an important aspect of
commonsense reasoning: the ability to reason about an outside world that has
particular constraints (for instance of physical or financial nature) that are not
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subject to discussion.1
Suppose one would like to apply Dung’s theory in the presence of strict and
defeasible rules. That is, the idea is to apply the strict and defeasible rules to
construct the arguments of the argumentation framework.2 How can one be
sure that the outcome makes sense from logical perspective? Suppose there
exists a rule representing the reason “given the current budget, if we acquire
both product X and Y, then we cannot acquire product Z anymore”, together
with various other rules. In that case, what one would like to avoid is arguments
for buying product X, Y and Z becoming justified (perhaps even in the same
extension) because this would mean the constraint is violated. In principle,
we could of course look inside of the arguments to check that what we select
does not violate any constraint. However, the whole idea of Dung’s abstract
argumentation theory3 is not to look at the internal structure of the arguments,
and to select them based purely on their position in the graph. However, if one
cannot look inside of the arguments when selecting them, then how does one
make sure that the overall outcome (regarding conclusions on, say, what to do
or what to believe) makes any sense?
In the current chapter, we examine the question of how to apply Dung’s
theory of abstract argumentation for the purpose of non-monotonic reasoning
with strict and defeasible rules. That is, we examine how to apply abstract
argumentation semantics while making sure the overall outcome (in terms of
justified conclusions) still makes sense. The remaining part of this chapter is
structured as follows. First, we will state some formal preliminaries on rule-
based argumentation in Section 2. Then, in Section 3 we examine three desir-
able properties of the overall outcome (direct consistency, indirect consistency
and closure) and examine various ways of satisfying these properties. Then,
in Section 4 we examine two additional desirable properties (non-interference
and crash resistance) that are particularly relevant when the strict rules are
derived from classical logic, and again examine various ways of satisfying these
properties. We round off with a summary and discussion in Section 5.
1Some argumentation researchers have claimed (personal communication) that if one digs
deep enough, even strict rules start to have exceptions, and that therefore only defeasible
rules exist. While this may be true from philosophical perspective, one often wants to restrict
the domain of reasoning and not take the more esoteric exceptions into account. The rule
”given the current budget, if we acquire both product X and Y, we cannot acquire product Z
anymore” may have exceptions if one is willing to steal, but this exception is of little relevance
when the setting is a meeting at work. Also, the very idea of modelling information (be it
by means of rules or by any other means) is that one limits oneself to a particular Universe
of Discourse. Hence, strict rules can be seen as defeasible rules whose exceptions are beyond
our current Universe of Discourse.
2Basically, this is done by chaining the rules together into inference trees, like is for
instance done in [Modgil and Prakken, 2014; Toni, 2014; Caminada et al., 2014b; Caminada
et al., 2015].
3Keep in mind that in Dung’s theory, arguments are abstract, not atomic. Atomic would
mean that arguments have no internal structure at all. Abstract means that arguments do
have an internal structure, but that one does not take this structure into account (that is,
one has abstracted from the internal structure.
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2 Formal Preliminaries
In the current section, we outline the process of constructing an argumentation
framework from a set of strict and defeasible rules. For current purposes, we
base our approach on the work of Caminada et al. [2014b].4
Definition 1 Given a logical language that is closed under negation (¬), an
argumentation system is a tuple AS = (Rs,Rd, n,≤) where:
• Rs is a finite set of strict inference rules of the form ϕ1, . . . , ϕn → ϕ
(where ϕi, ϕ are meta-variables ranging over L and n ≥ 0)
• Rd is a finite set of defeasible inference rules of the form ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ⇒
ϕ (where ϕi, ϕ are meta-variables ranging over L and n ≥ 0)
• n is a partial function such that n : Rd −→ L
• ≤ is a partial pre-order on Rd
We write ψ = −ϕ in case ψ = ¬ϕ or ϕ = ¬ψ (we will sometimes informally
say that formulas ϕ and −ϕ are each other’s negation).
To keep things simple, we assume that the logical language L consists of
literals only.5
In the following definition, arguments are constructed from strict and defea-
sible rules in an inductive way. This process starts from the strict and defeasible
rules with empty antecedents (so where n = 0).
Definition 2 An argument A on the basis of an argumentation system AS =
(Rs,Rd, n,≤) is defined as:
1. A1, . . . , An → ψ if A1 . . . An (n ≥ 0) are arguments, and there is a strict
rule Conc(A1), . . . ,Conc(An)→ ψ in Rs. In that case we define
Conc(A) = ψ,
Sub(A) = Sub(A1) ∪ . . . ∪ Sub(An) ∪ {A}.
DefRules(A) = DefRules(A1) ∪ . . . ∪DefRules(An),
TopRule(A) = Conc(A1), . . . ,Conc(An)→ ψ
2. A1, . . . , An ⇒ ψ if A1 . . . An (n ≥ 0) are arguments, and there is a de-
feasible rule Conc(A1), . . . ,Conc(An)⇒ ψ in Rd. In that case we define
Conc(A) = ψ,
Sub(A) = Sub(A1) ∪ . . . ∪ Sub(An) ∪ {A},
DefRules(A) = DefRules(A1) ∪ . . . ∪DefRules(An) ∪
{Conc(A1), . . . ,Conc(An)⇒ ψ},
TopRule(A) = Conc(A1), . . . ,Conc(An)⇒ ψ.
4As such, we will for instance not consider the notion of contraries [Modgil and Prakken,
2014] or any other notions in aspic+ that are not relevant for current purposes.
5In Section 4 we generalise things by having L be the language of propositional logic.
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Furthermore, for any argument A and set of arguments E:
• A is strict iff DefRules(A) = ∅; defeasible iff DefRules(A) 6= ∅;
• If DefRules(A) = ∅, then LastDefRules(A) = ∅, else;
if A = A1, . . . , An ⇒ φ then LastDefRules(A) = {Conc(A1), . . . ,Conc(An)⇒
φ}, otherwise LastDefRules(A) = LastDefRules(A1)∪. . .∪LastDefRules(An).
• Concs(E) = {Conc(A) | A ∈ E}
• The closure under strict rules of E, denoted ClS(E) is the smallest set
containing Concs(E) and the consequent of any strict rule in Rs whose
antecedent is contained in ClS(E).
For current purposes (as well as is done in [Caminada and Amgoud, 2007;
Prakken, 2010; Caminada et al., 2014b]) we assume that the set of strict rules
is consistent in the following way.
Definition 3 Let AS = (Rs,Rd, n,≤) be an argumentation system. We say
that AS and Rs are consistent iff no strict arguments A and B exist such that
Conc(A) = −Conc(B)
Definition 4 Let A and B be arguments. We say that
• A undercuts B (on B′) iff Conc(A) = −n(r) for some B′ ∈ Sub(B) with
TopRule(B′) = r and r ∈ Rd
• A restrictively rebuts B (on B′) iff Conc(A) = −Conc(B′) for some
B′ ∈ Sub(B) with TopRule(B′) ∈ Rd
• A unrestrictively rebuts B (on B′) iff Conc(A) = −Conc(B′) for some
B′ ∈ Sub(B) with B′ being a defeasible argument
To illustrate the difference between restricted rebut and unrestricted rebut,
first consider the example of an argumentation system AS 1 with Rs = ∅ and
Rd = {⇒ a; a⇒ b; ⇒ c; c⇒ ¬b}. Here, the argument (⇒ a)⇒ b restrictively
and unrestrictively rebuts the argument (⇒ c)⇒ ¬b, and vice versa. In the ar-
gumentation system AS 2 with Rs = {→ a; a→ b} and Rd = {⇒ c; c⇒ ¬b},
the argument (→ a)→ b restrictively and unrestrictively rebuts the argument
(⇒ c) ⇒ ¬b, but the argument (⇒ c) ⇒ ¬b does not restrictively or unre-
strictively rebut the argument (→ a) → b. In the argumentation system AS 3
with Rs = {a → b; → c} and Rd = {⇒ a; c ⇒ ¬b} the argument (⇒ a) → b
restrictively and unrestrictively rebuts the argument (→ c) ⇒ ¬b, and the ar-
gument (→ c)⇒ ¬b unrestrictively (but not restrictively) rebuts the argument
(⇒ a) → b. To sum up, with restrictive rebut one needs to check whether
the last rule of the attacked conclusion6 is defeasible whereas with unrestricted
6meaning: of the conclusion one argues against by providing an argument for its contrary
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rebut one needs to check whether any previous rule of the attacked conclusion
is defeasible.
The intuition behind unrestricted rebut is that a conclusion is defeasible iff
it has been derived using at least one defeasible rule. If the conclusion has
been derived using strict rules only, then the conclusion is strict and cannot
be argued against. The intuition behind restricted rebut, on the other hand,
is that (like in classical logic) in order to argue against a particular derivation,
one has to argue against its premises. So instead of attacking the consequent
of a strict rule, one has to attack its antecedent, unless this antecedent itself
consists of the consequents of strict rules, in which case one has to keep on
going backwards until finding a defeasible rule. It holds that if A restrictively
rebuts B, then A also unrestrictively rebuts B, but not vice versa.
One last subtle aspect of the definition of restricted and unrestricted rebut
(Definition 4) is that one only looks at the subargument B′ that yields the
conclusion that one is arguing against. So in the argumentation system AS 4
with Rs = {→ c; c → ¬b} and Rd = {⇒ a; a ⇒ b; ¬b ⇒ d} the argument
(⇒ a) ⇒ b does not (restrictively or unrestrictively) rebut the argument ((→
c) → ¬b) ⇒ d, even though the latter argument is defeasible, because the
subargument that yields the attacked conclusion ¬b is strict.
The difference between restricted and unrestricted rebut is relevant not just
because they are based on different intuitions, but also because choosing to
implement either restricted or unrestricted rebut has consequences for how one
should define the rest of the argumentation formalism if the aim is to yield
some kind of reasonable output in terms of justified conclusions. Details will
follow further on in the current chapter.
Apart from (restrictive and unrestrictive) rebutting, Definition 4 also intro-
duces the concept of undercutting. Whereas with rebutting, one argues against
the conclusion of an argument (or against the conclusion of a subargument),
with undercutting one argues against the applicability of a particular defeasible
rule. A classical example of undercutting has been given by Pollock [1995]: “If
an object looks red, then it actually is red, unless it is illuminated by a red
light”. Formally, this can be modelled using argumentation system AS 5 with
Rs = {→ looksred ; → redlight}, Rd = {looksred ⇒ isred ; redlight ⇒ ¬lris}
and n(looksred ⇒ isred) = lris. Here, the argument (→ looksred) ⇒ isred is
undercut by the argument (→ redlight) ⇒ ¬lris. Although undercutting does
not play a major role in the remaining part of the current chapter, we have
still chosen to introduce it, as it is a piece of functionality that can be im-
plemented while still warranting an overall reasonable outcome regarding the
justified conclusions.
Another piece of functionality that some formalisms have implemented is
that of argument strength.7 Argument strength is often defined based on an
ordering of the defeasible rules. However, as arguments can be constructed
7Argument strength is sometimes referred to as argument preferences in the work of
Prakken [2010], Modgil and Prakken [2014] and of Caminada et al. [2014b].
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using more than one defeasible rule, one needs a way of applying the strength
ordering between individual rules to determine a strength ordering between sets
of rules. Two principles for doing so have been defined in the literature: the
elitist and the democratic set ordering [Modgil and Prakken, 2014; Caminada
et al., 2014b].
Definition 5 Let ≤⊆ (Rd ×Rd) be a total pre-ordering on the defeasible in-
ference rules, where as usual, r < r′ iff r ≤ r′ and r  r′, and r ≡ r′ iff r ≤ r′
and r′ ≤ r. Then for any E , E ′ ⊆ Rd Es (s ∈ {Eli, Dem}) is defined as follows:
1. If E = ∅ then E 5s E ′ ;
2. If E ′ = ∅ and E 6= ∅ then E Es E ′ ; else:
3. if s = Eli: E EEli E ′ if ∃r1 ∈ E s.t. ∀r2 ∈ E ′, r1 ≤ r2. else:
4. if s = Dem: E EDem E ′ if ∀r1 ∈ E, ∃r2 ∈ E ′, r1 ≤ r2.
As usual E s E ′ iff E Es E ′ and E ′ 5s E
The elitist and democratic set ordering principles assume the presence of
sets of defeasible rules. This leads to the question of how to determine the
relevant sets of defeasible rules when one argument rebuts another. Again, two
principles have been formulated in the literature, called weakest link and last
link. With weakest link, one takes into account all defeasible rules (of both the
rebutting argument and the rebutted (sub)argument), whereas with last link,
one takes into account only the last defeasible rule(s). Given the weakest link
and the last link principles for determining the sets of relevant defeasible rules,
as well as the elitist and democratic set ordering principles for evaluating these
sets of defeasible rules, one can identify four different principles for determining
argument strength.
Definition 6 Let Ar be the set of arguments that can be constructed using
argumentation system (Rs,Rd, n,≤). Then ∀A,B ∈ Ar:
1. A Ewl B iff DefRules(A) EEli DefRules(B)
2. A Ell B iff LastDefRules(A) EEli LastDefRules(B)
3. A Dwl B iff DefRules(A) EDem DefRules(B)
4. A Dll B iff LastDefRules(A) EDem LastDefRules(B)
where Ewl, Ell, Dwl and Dll respectively denote ‘ Elitist weakest link’,
‘ Elitist last link’, ‘ Democratic weakest link’ and ‘ Democratic last link’.
We may write A ≺p B iff A p B and B p A, and write A ≈p B iff
A p B,B p A (where p ∈ {Ewl, Ell, Dwl, Dll}). It is straightforward to show
that ≺p is a strict partial ordering (irreflexive, transitive and asymmetric).
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We are now ready to define the overall notion of defeat. For this, we follow
the approach of formalisms like aspic+ [Modgil and Prakken, 2014] and aspic-
[Caminada et al., 2014b], where the notion of defeat stands for attack after
argument strength has been taken into account. It is defeat, not attack, that
is then used to define the argumentation framework.
Definition 7 Let Ar be the set of arguments that can be constructed using
argumentation system AS = (Rs,Rd, n,≤) Let p be the associated argument
strength order on Ar as defined in Definition 6. Then def ur ⊆ Ar × Ar is
defined as (A,B) ∈ def ur iff A undercuts B or A unrestrictively rebuts B on
B′ and A 6≺p B′, and def rr ⊆ Ar × Ar is defined as (A,B) ∈ def rr iff A
undercuts B or A restrictively rebuts B on B′ and A 6≺p B′.
We observe that the set of arguments Ar , together with the associated de-
feat relation (either def ur or def rr) defines a Dung-style argumentation frame-
work. On this argumentation framework, one can then apply the standard
argumentation semantics, as described in Chapter XXX (“abstract argumen-
tation frameworks and their semantics”) of this volume.
3 Direct Consistency, Indirect Consistency and Closure
To illustrate the issue of rationality postulates, consider the following example.
Example 1 ([Caminada and Amgoud, 2007]) Consider an argumentation
system AS = (Rs,Rd, n,≤) with Rs = {→ r; → n; m → hs; b → ¬hs},
Rd = {r ⇒ m; n⇒ b}, n = ∅ and ≤= ∅.
An intuitive interpretation of this example is the following:
“John wears a ring (r) on his finger. John is also a regular nightclubber (n).
Someone who wears a ring on his finger is usually married (m). Someone who
is a regular nightclubber is usually bachelor (b). Someone who’s married by
definition has a spouse (hs). Someone who’s bachelor by definition does not
have a spouse (¬hs).”
We can construct the following arguments.
A1 :→ r A3 : A1 ⇒ m A5 : A3 → hs
A2 :→ n A4 : A2 ⇒ b A6 : A4 → ¬hs
If one were to apply unrestricted rebut, the only defeat would be between A5
and A6. That is, def ur = {(A5, A6), (A6, A5)}. This then implies that for in-
stance the grounded extension is {A1, A2, A3, A4}, yielding the associated set
of (grounded) justified conclusions {r, n,m, b}. The problem with these conclu-
sions, however, is that they do not take into account the meaning of the strict
rules of the argumentation system: that if one holds the antecedent of a strict
rule to be the case, one must also hold what deductively follows from it (the
consequent of the rule). For instance, from the fact that we obtain m, together
with the strict rule m → hs we should also have obtained hs, as a married
person by definition has a spouse, so by John being married we cannot escape
the conclusion that he has a spouse. Yet, the fact that John has a spouse is
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not represented in the set of justified conclusions (that is, hs 6∈ {r, n,m, b}).
This brings us to the first problem: the set of justified conclusions is not closed
under the strict rules.
Another problem appears when also applying the strict rule b → ¬hs. After
all, John is also considered to be a bachelor, so we cannot escape the conclusion
that he does not have a spouse (¬hs). However, when we also apply the rule
m→ hs, as we did earlier, then we derive that John both has a spouse and does
not have a spouse. So not only is our set {r, n,m, b} of justified conclusions not
closed under the strict rules, if we do try to compute its closure, this closure
turns out to be inconsistent!
So far, we examined what happens regarding the justified conclusions in case
we apply unrestricted rebut. However, if we were to base the defeat relation
on restricted rebut instead, then the outcome would even be worse, as the de-
feat relation would become empty (that is, def rr = ∅) which means that (when
still applying grounded semantics) one obtains {A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, A6} as the
grounded extension and {r, n,m, b, hs,¬hs} as the associated justified conclu-
sions. So here, we don’t even need to close the justified conclusions under the
strict rules in order to obtain an inconsistent outcome, as the set of justified
conclusions is already inconsistent by itself.
From Example 1 we observe that there are at least three desirable properties
a set of conclusions should satisfy.
Postulate 1 Let S ⊆ L be a set of justified conclusions yielded by an argu-
mentation system. S should satisfy:
• direct consistency, meaning that ¬∃x : x,−x ∈ S
• closure, meaning that ClRs(S) = S
• indirect consistency, meaning that ¬∃x : x,−x ∈ ClRs(S)
Early formalisations of argumentation theory tried to avoid problems like
those illustrated in Example 1 by tinkering with the definition of defeat. How-
ever, as explained by Caminada and Amgoud [2007], this does not actually lead
to the properties of Postulate 1 being satisfied. Clearly, some more fundamen-
tal solutions are needed. In the following two subsections, we examine some of
the solutions that have been described in the literature, distinguishing between
solutions that have been obtained for restricted rebut and solutions that have
been obtained for unrestricted rebut.
3.1 Restricted Rebut Solutions
In the current section, we examine some of the solutions that have been de-
scribed in the literature for satisfying direct consistency, indirect consistency
and closure when the defeat relation is based on restricted rebut.
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We recall that, when applying restricted rebut to Example 1 this results in
the empty defeat relation, that is def rr = ∅. One could argue that this is be-
cause something is wrong with the information encoded in the argumentation
system AS , in particular with the set of strict rule Rs. If one were for instance
to add the additional strict rules ¬hs → ¬m and hs → ¬b then the problem
would be solved. This is because one could then construct additional arguments
A7 : A5 → ¬b and A8 : A6 → ¬m. It holds that A7 restrictively rebuts A4 (as
well as each argument that contains A4, so also A6 and A8) and that A8 restric-
tively rebuts A3 (as well as each argument that contains A3, so also A5 and A7).
So overall we obtain the argumentation framework shown in Figure 1. This
argumentation framework yields the grounded extension {A1, A2} (with asso-
ciated conclusions {r, n}) and preferred extensions {A1, A2, A3, A5, A7} (with
associated conclusions {r, n,m, hs,¬b}) and {A1, A2, A4, A6, A8} (with associ-
ated conclusions {r, n, b,¬hs,¬m}). As we can see, each set of conclusions
yielded under grounded or preferred semantics satisfies the postulates of direct
consistency, closure and indirect consistency.
A2A1
A3 A7 A5
A6A8A4
Figure 1. Argumentation framework of Example 1 after adding the rules ¬hs→
¬m and hs→ ¬b.
Adding the rules ¬hs→ ¬m and hs→ ¬b can be seen as a reasonable thing
to do. After all, Rs already contains a rule m → hs, meaning that without
possible exception, someone who is married by definition has a spouse. This
implies that someone who does not have a spouse cannot be married. Hence,
¬hs → ¬m. Using similar reasoning, one can use the rule b → ¬hs to derive
hs→ ¬b. Hence, the rules ¬hs→ ¬m and hs→ ¬b were already “implicitly”
contained in Rs. Adding them explicitly can therefore be seen as doing justice
to Rs, and has as a side effect that the postulates of direct consistency, closure
and indirect consistency become satisfied.
Adding the “contraposed” version of a strict rule is relatively straightforward
when the antecedent of the rule consists just of a single formula (as is for
instance the case for m → hs and b → ¬hs) but gets more complicated when
the antecedent consists of multiple formulas. For this, a generalised version of
contraposition is needed, which is referred to as transposition [Caminada and
Amgoud, 2007].
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Definition 8 ([Caminada and Amgoud, 2007]) Let ϕ1, . . . , ϕn → ϕ (n ≥
0) be a strict rule. A transposed version of this rule is of the form ϕ1, . . . , ϕi−1,
−ϕ,ϕi+1, . . . , ϕn → −ϕ (for some i ∈ {1 . . . n}). We say that a set of strict
rules Rs is closed under transposition when for each strict rule in Rs, each of
its transposed versions is also in Rs.
As an example, the strict rule a,¬b, c → d has three transposed versions:
¬d,¬b, c→ ¬a, a,¬d, c→ b and a,¬b,¬d→ ¬c.
An example of an argumentation formalism that applies transposition to
satisfy direct consistency, closure and indirect consistency is aspic+ [Modgil
and Prakken, 2014]. In aspic+ the following design choices have been made:
• the set of strict rules Rs is consistent and closed under transposition
• restricted rebut is applied
• argument strength is based on a partial pre-order on the defeasible rules,
together with either the last-link or weakest link selection principle and
either the elitist or democratic set ordering principle8
• the argumentation semantics is complete-based, meaning that it selects
one or more complete extensions (examples of complete-based semantics
are grounded, preferred, complete, semi-stable, ideal and eager semantics)
It is shown that under these choices, the overall outcome of the formalism
satisfies direct consistency, closure and indirect consistency.
To understand why transposition plays an important role in satisfying the
properties of direct consistency, closure and indirect consistency, it can be useful
to give a sketch of proof. We start with the property of direct consistency. Sup-
pose, towards a contradiction, that there exists a complete extension yielding
conclusions that are directly inconsistent. This means there exists an argument
A for conclusion c and an argument B for conclusion −c (see Figure 2). As
the set of strict rules Rs is consistent, at least one of these arguments must be
defeasible. Assume without loss of generality that argument A is defeasible.
Then A must contain at least one defeasible rule. Now, identify a defeasible
rule r that is “as high as possible” in A (that is, whose distance to the conclu-
sion c is minimal). Let e be the consequent of r and let Ai be the subargument
of A that has r as its top rule (so Conc(Ai) = e). Let A1, . . . , An be the sub-
arguments of A that have the same “depth” as Ai (that is, whose respective
top-rules have the same distance to conclusion c). It turns out to be possible to
build an argument D′ that defeats Ai by deriving conclusion −e. Recall that
“above” each Ai there are only strict rules in A (after all, r was the “highest”
defeasible rule in A). In case these strict rules consist of only one layer, there ex-
ists a single strict rule Conc(A1), . . . ,Conc(An)→ c) with transposed version
8More precisely, argument strength has to be based on a reasonable argument ordering
[Modgil and Prakken, 2014], which is satisfied by applying either the weakest link or the last
link selection principle, in combination with applying either the democratic or the elitist set
ordering principle.
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Figure 2. Sketch of proof direct consistency (restricted rebut)
Conc(A1), . . . ,Conc(Ai−1),−c,Conc(Ai+1), . . . ,Conc(An) → −Conc(Ai), so
Conc(A1), . . . ,Conc(Ai−1),Conc(B),Conc(Ai+1), . . . ,Conc(An)→ −c, which
implies we can use A1, . . . Ai−1, B and Ai+1, . . . , An to construct an argument
that restrictively rebuts Ai. In case the strict rules above each Ai consist of
more than one layer, then one can still use transposition to construct an ar-
gument that restrictively rebuts Ai (basically by induction over the number
of layers of strict rules). Let D′ be the thus constructed argument that re-
strictively rebuts Ai. As Ai is a subargument of A, it follows that D
′ also
restrictively rebuts A. From the fact that we are considering a complete ex-
tension, it follows that the extension has to contain an argument (say C) that
defeats D′. However, as each defeasible rule of D′ also occurs in A or B, it
follows that C also defeats A or B.9 Hence, the complete extension is not
conflict-free. Contradiction.
It is important to observe that the above sketch of proof uses the facts that
(1) Rs is consistent, (2) Rs is closed under transposition, (3) restricted rebut
is being applied, and (4) we are considering a complete extension (or at least
an admissible set).10
As for the property of closure, suppose there exists a strict rule ϕ1, . . . , ϕn →
ϕ and that the conclusions ϕ1, . . . , ϕn are yielded by our complete extension.
We need to show that conclusion ϕ is also yielded by the complete exten-
sion. From the fact that conclusions ϕ1, . . . , ϕn are yielded, it follows that the
complete extension contains arguments A1, . . . , An with conclusions ϕ1, . . . , ϕn
respectively. Now consider the argument A : A1, . . . , An → ϕ. Let B be an
arbitrary argument that defeats A. Then from the definition of defeat, it fol-
lows that B also defeats at least one of A1, . . . , An. From the fact that our
extension is complete (and therefore also admissible) it follows that it contains
an argument (say C) that defeats B. This means that A is defended by the
complete extension, and must therefore also be contained in the complete ex-
9This is straightforward to see when the strength ordering between the rules is empty, but
also holds when the strength ordering is non-empty. See the work of Modgil and Prakken
[2013] for details
10There are also some requirements regarding argument strength. These are such that
Ewl, Ell, Dwl, and Dll (Definition 6) satisfy them. We refer to the work of Modgil and
Prakken [2013; 2014] for details.
12 Martin Caminada
tension.11 This then implies that the complete extension also yields conclusion
Conc(A) = ϕ.
Given that we have obtained both direct consistency and closure, the prop-
erty of indirect consistency is trivially satisfied.
As was mentioned above, the property of transposition plays an important
role for satisfying direct consistency, closure and indirect consistency. However,
if one takes a closer look at the above sketch of proof, what is actually applied is
a property that is more general than transposition. Going back to Figure 2 then
what is actually needed is that if from Conc(A1), . . . ,Conc(An) one can apply
strict rules to derive c, then from Conc(A1), . . . ,Conc(Ai−1), c,Conc(Ai+1), . . . ,
Conc(An) one can also apply strict rules to derive −Conc(Ai). This property
is called contraposition by Modgil and Prakken [2013; 2014], who show that
direct consistency, closure and indirect consistency are satisfied when the set
of strict rules is closed under contraposition.
One can ask the question of whether it is possible to derive even more gen-
eral conditions than transposition and contraposition, under which direct con-
sistency, closure and indirect consistency are still satisfied. This question is
answered positively by Dung and Thang [2014] who present a semi-abstract ap-
proach that abstracts away from most aspects of argument structure (making
explicit only the notions of a conclusion and that of a subargument). However,
their approach does rely on particular constraints on the defeat relation, and
it can be observed that these constraints can only be satisfied under restricted
(and not unrestricted) rebut.12
3.2 Unrestricted Rebut Solutions
Although restricted rebut has become the most popular principle for defin-
ing the overall defeat relationship (as is for instance evidenced by the various
versions of the aspic+ formalism [Prakken, 2010; Modgil and Prakken, 2013;
Modgil and Prakken, 2014]) it does have some disadvantages, especially when
applied in a dialectical context. Consider for instance the following discussion
taken from [Caminada et al., 2014b].
John: “Bob will attend both AAMAS and IJCAI this year, as he has papers
accepted at each of these conferences.“
Mary: “That won’t be possible, as his budget of £1000 only allows for one
foreign trip.”
Formally, this discussion can be modelled using the argumentation system
(Rs,Rd, n,≤) with Rd = {accA ⇒ attA; accI ⇒ attI; budget ⇒ ¬attboth}
andRs = {→ accA; → accI; → budget; attA, attI → attboth; ¬attboth, attI →
¬attA; attA,¬attboth→ ¬attI}.13
11Notice that for this reasoning step, a complete extension is really needed; an admissible
set is not sufficient.
12More precisely, unrestricted rebut trivialises the notion of a base [Dung and Thang, 2014],
which prevents the results of Dung and Thang [2014] from being applied in the context of
unrestricted rebut.
13We observe that Rs is consistent and closed under transposition.
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John: ((→ accA)⇒ attA), ((→ accI)⇒ attI)→ attboth
Mary: (→ budget)⇒ ¬attboth
The problem is that when applying restricted rebut, Mary’s argument does
not defeat John’s argument. This is because the conclusion that Mary wants to
attack (attboth) is the consequent of a strict rule. If Mary wants to restrictively
rebut John’s argument, she can only do so by attacking the consequent of a
defeasible rule. That is, she would be forced to choose to defeat either attA or
attI, meaning that she essentially has to utter one of the following statements.
Mary′: Bob won’t attend AAMAS because he will already attend IJCAI, and
his budget doesn’t allow him to attend both.
Mary′′: Bob won’t attend IJCAI because he will already attend AAMAS, and
his budget doesn’t allow him to attend both.
The associated formal counterarguments are as follows.
Mary′: ((→ budget)⇒ ¬attboth), ((→ accI)⇒ attI)→ ¬attA
Mary′′: ((→ accA)⇒ attA), ((→ budget)⇒ ¬attboth)→ ¬attI
Critically, Mary does not know which of the two conferences Bob will attend,
yet the principle of restricted rebut forces her to make concrete statements on
this. From the perspective of commitment in dialogue [Walton and Krabbe,
1995], this is unnatural. One should not be forced to commit to things one has
insufficient reasons to believe in.
It should be stressed that the problem outlined above is particularly relevant
in dialectical contexts, where different agents make commitments during the
exchange of arguments. This contrasts with a formalism like aspic+, which is
more monolithic in nature, in that from the given rules and premises, one con-
structs a graph of each other defeating arguments and simply computes which
arguments (and associated conclusions) are justified. Concepts like different
agents, communication steps or commitment stores do not play a role in as-
pic+, and hence restricted rebut seems acceptable. However, if one wants to
add dialectical aspects to formal argumentation (c.f., [Caminada and Wu, 2009;
Caminada and Podlaszewski, 2012; Caminada et al., 2014a]) then one is forced
to take the limitations of restricted rebut seriously.
The obvious way to deal with problems like sketched above would be to
simply replace restricted rebut by unrestricted rebut (thus replacing def rr by
def ur). Unfortunately, doing so also has far reaching consequences regarding
the ability to satisfy the postulates of indirect consistency and closure. This is
illustrated by the following example, taken from [Caminada and Wu, 2011].
Example 2 Consider the argumentation system (Rs,Rd, n,≤) with Rs = {→
jw; → mw; → sw; mt, st → ¬jt; jt, st → ¬mt; jt,mt → ¬st} and Rd =
{jw ⇒ jt; mw ⇒ mt; sw ⇒ st}. This example can be interpreted as follows.
John, Mary and Suzy want to go cycling in the countryside (→ jw; → mw; →
sw). They have a tandem bicycle that each of them would like to be on (jw ⇒
jt; mw ⇒ mt; sw ⇒ st). However, as the tandem only has two seats, if
two of them are on it, the third one cannot be on it (mt, st → ¬jt; jt, st →
¬mt; jt,mt → ¬st). Using this argumentation system, we can construct the
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Figure 3. restricted rebut versus unrestricted rebut
following arguments.
A1 :→ jw A4 : A1 ⇒ jt A7 : A5, A6 → ¬jt
A2 :→ mw A5 : A2 ⇒ mt A8 : A4, A6 → ¬mt
A3 :→ sw A6 : A3 ⇒ st A9 : A4, A5 → ¬st
When applying restricted rebut (and assuming the empty rule strength or-
dering) argument A7 defeats A4 (as well as A8 and A9, which contain A4),
argument A8 defeats A5 (as well as A7 and A9, which contain A5) and argu-
ment A9 defeats A6 (as well as A7 and A8, which contain A6). This yields the
argumentation framework at the left hand side of Figure 3, which we will refer
to as AF rr.
AF rr has four complete extensions: {A1, A2, A3, A5, A6, A7} (yielding con-
clusions {jw,mw, sw,¬jt,mt, st}), {A1, A2, A3, A4, A6, A8} (yielding conclu-
sions {jw,mw, sw, jt,¬mt, st}), {A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, A9} (yielding conclusions
{jw,mw, sw, jt,mt,¬st}), and {A1, A2, A3} (yielding conclusions {jw,mw, sw}).
The first three complete extensions are also preferred (as well as stable and
semi-stable). The last one is also grounded. We observe that the conclusions
of each complete extension satisfy directly consistency, closure and indirectly
consistency.
Now, let us consider what happens if we were to replace restricted rebut by
unrestricted rebut. In that case, A7 would still defeat A4 (as well as A8 and
A9), A8 would still defeat A5 (as well as A7 and A9) and A9 would still de-
feat A6 (as well as A7 and A8). However, additionally A4 would defeat A7,
A5 would defeat A8 and A6 would defeat A9. This is because A7, A8 and A9
are defeasible arguments, as their subarguments contain defeasible rules. So
with unrestricted rebut, the arguments A4, A5 and A6 are able to “strike back”
against their respective defeaters. This yields the argumentation framework at
the right hand side of Figure 3, which we will refer to as AFur. AFur has five
complete extensions. The first four are the same as those of AF rr. The fifth one
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is {A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, A6} yielding conclusions {jw,mw, sw, jt,mt, st}, hence
violating closure and indirect consistency. As this fifth complete extension is
also preferred, stable and semi-stable, we have a counterexample against apply-
ing unrestricted rebut under each of these semantics.
Example 2 illustrates a fundamental difference between restricted and un-
restricted rebut. Whereas under restricted rebut (in combination with Rs
being consistent and closed under transposition or contraposition) any ad-
missible set of arguments will yield conclusions that are indirectly consis-
tent, under unrestricted rebut admissibility alone is not sufficient (the set
{A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, A6} being the counter example). It turns out that what
is needed is a property that is stronger than admissibility: strong admissibil-
ity [Baroni and Giacomin, 2009; Caminada, 2014].14 We observe that although
the set {A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, A6} is admissible, it is not strongly admissible. Fur-
thermore, we observe that the set {A1, A2, A3} is both admissible and strongly
admissible and yields conclusions {jw,mw, sw} that are closed and indirectly
consistent.
As the grounded extension is the unique biggest strongly admissible set [Ba-
roni and Giacomin, 2009; Caminada, 2014], grounded semantics is a natural
starting point for proving the properties of direct consistency, indirect consis-
tency and closure when applying unrestricted rebut. Proving the property of
direct consistency is relatively straightforward. After all, if the grounded ex-
tension was to yield conclusions that are directly inconsistent, it would have
to contain two arguments A and B with opposite conclusions. As Rs is con-
sistent, at least one of them has to be defeasible, which means that one would
defeat (unrestrictedly rebut) the other, which would implies that the grounded
extension is not conflict-free. Contradiction.
Proving the property of closure is a bit more complex, as it is done by
induction using the inductive definition of the grounded extension. We refer to
the work of Caminada and Amgoud [2007] and of Caminada et al. [2014b] for
details. Indirect consistency then follows trivially from direct consistency and
closure.
As for argument strength, two possibilities have been observed when it comes
to satisfying closure and indirect consistency under unrestricted rebut. The first
approach, of Caminada and Amgoud [2007], is to essentially have the empty
ordering on the defeasible rules. A later approach, by Caminada et al. [2014b]
is to have a total (!) pre-order among the defeasible rules.
An overall overview of approaches to satisfy direct consistency, closure and
indirect consistency is provided in Table 1.
14We recall that a set of argumentsArgs is strongly admissible iff each A ∈ Args is defended
by some Args′ ⊆ Args \ {A} which in its turn is again strongly admissible. Informally, the
idea of strong admissibility is that each argument should be defended without going around
in circles.
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Table 1. Approaches for satisfying closure and direct/indirect consistency
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4 Non-Interference and Crash Resistance
One of the issues to decide when formulating an argumentation system is
whether the (strict and defeasible) rules should be domain dependent or do-
main independent. An example of a domain dependent strict rule would be
cow → mammal. An example of a domain independent strict rule would be
modus ponens, so cow, cow ⊃ mammal → mammal. When the aim is to
implement domain independent reasoning, the most obvious thing to do would
be to base the strict rules on some form of classical logic. For current pur-
poses, we examine what happens if one were to base the set of strict rules on
propositional logic.
Definition 9 Given the language L of propositional logic, a defeasible theory
is a tuple (P,Rd, n,≤) where
• P is a consistent set of propositions (called premises)
• Rd is a set of defeasible rules of the form ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ⇒ ϕ (where ϕi, ϕ
are meta-variables ranging over L)
• n is a function such that n : Rd −→ L
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Figure 4. Strict rules as classical logic can have side effects (simple example)
Given a defeasible theory (P,Rd, n,≤), we define the associated argumentation
system as (Rs,Rd, n,≤) with Rs = {→ ϕ | ϕ ∈ P} ∪ {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn → ϕ |
ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ` ϕ}
As P is a consistent set of formulas, Rs will be consistent. Moreover, Rs is
also closed under transposition. This is because the set {→ ϕ | ϕ ∈ P} is triv-
ially closed under transposition (as a rule with an empty antecedent does not
have any transposed versions) and the set {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn → ϕ | ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ` ϕ} is
closed under transposition as ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ` ϕ implies ϕ1, . . . , ϕi−1,−ϕ,ϕi+1, . . . ,
ϕn ` −ϕ. However, basing strict rules on classical logic also brings an addi-
tional type of problems. Consider the following example.
Example 3 Consider the defeasible theory (P,Rd, n,≤) with P = {js,mns},
Rd = {js⇒ s; mns⇒ ¬s; wfr ⇒ r} and n and ≤ being the empty ordering.
This example can be interpreted as follows. John says the cup of coffee contains
sugar, so it probably contains sugar (→ js; js ⇒ s). Mary says the cup of
coffee does not contain sugar (→ mns; mns ⇒ ¬s). The weather forecaster
predicts rain tomorrow, so it will rain tomorrow (→ wfr; wfr ⇒ r). Hence,
although we’re not sure about whether the cup of coffee contains sugar, at least
we should believe that it will rain tomorrow. Using this argumentation system,
at least the following arguments can be constructed.
A1 :→ js A4 : A1 ⇒ s
A2 :→ mns A5 : A2 ⇒ ¬s
A3 :→ wfr A6 : A3 ⇒ r
However, classical logic also yields the strict rule s,¬s→ ¬r, as s,¬s ` ¬r ( ex
falso quodlibet). With this rule, we can construct the following argument.
A7 : A4, A5 → ¬r
This yields the argumentation framework of Figure 4.15
If one were to apply for instance grounded semantics, the grounded extension
{A1, A2, A3} would yield conclusions {j,m,wf}. Thus, the weather forecast is
not believed because John and Mary are having a disagreement about a cup of
coffee.
The first thing to observe about Example 3 is that the underlying problem
15Notice that we are applying restricted rebut, but similar problems also occur when ap-
plying unrestricted rebut
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cannot be solved simply by removing rules with an inconsistent antecedent.
This is because the effects of the rule s,¬s→ ¬r can be simulated by the rules
s→ s∨¬r and s∨¬r,¬s→ ¬r, which still allow us to construct an argument
for ¬r from A4 and A5.
One approach that has been proposed in the literature [Prakken, 2010] is to
change the semantics. If one were to apply for instance not grounded but pre-
ferred semantics to the argumentation framework of Figure 4, then two exten-
sions would result: {A1, A2, A3, A4, A6} (yielding conclusions {j,m,wf, s, r})
and {A1, A2, A3, A5, A6} (yielding conclusions {j,m,wf,¬s, r}). We observe
that each set of conclusions contains r, so r is a justified conclusion under
preferred semantics.
Although changing grounded semantics to preferred semantics seems to yield
the desired outcome in Example 3, there exists a slightly more complex example
where preferred semantics does not yield the desired outcome.
Example 4 Consider the defeasible theory (P,Rd, n,≤) with P = {js,mns,
junrel,munrel, wfr}, Rd = {js ⇒ s; mns ⇒ ¬s; wfr ⇒ r; junrel ⇒
¬jrel; munrel → ¬mrel}, n(js ⇒ s) = n(junrel ⇒ ¬jrel) = jrel, n(mns ⇒
¬s) = n(munrel ⇒ ¬mrel) = mrel and ≤ being the empty ordering. So now,
in addition to John saying that the cup of coffee contains sugar, he also says
that he is unreliable, so John is probably unreliable (junrel ⇒ ¬jrel). How-
ever, if John is unreliable, then the fact that he says something is no longer
a reason to believe it. Hence the rule (js ⇒ s) is undercut, just like the rule
(junrel⇒ ¬jrel). Similarly, in addition to Mary saying that the cup of coffee
does not contain sugar, she also says that she is unreliable, so Mary is prob-
ably unreliable (munrel ⇒ ¬mrel). However, if Mary is unreliable, then the
fact that she says something is no longer a reason to believe it. Hence the rule
(mns ⇒ ¬s) is undercut, just like the rule (munrel ⇒ ¬mrel). Overall, we
can construct at least the following arguments.
A1 :→ js A4 : A1 ⇒ s
A2 :→ mns A5 : A2 ⇒ ¬s
A3 :→ wfr A6 : A3 ⇒ r
A8 :→ junrel A10 : A8 ⇒ ¬jrel
A9 :→ munrel A11 : A9 ⇒ ¬mrel
Classical logic again yields the strict rule s,¬s → ¬r, which allows the con-
struction of the following argument.
A7 : A4, A5 → ¬r
This yields the argumentation framework of Figure 5.16
In the argumentation framework of Figure 5 there exists just a single com-
plete extension (that is also grounded, preferred, ideal and semi-stable): {A1, A2,
A3, A8, A9} yielding conclusions {js,mns,wfr, junrel,munrel}. So again, we
have that the weather forecast is not believed (under any admissibility-based
16Notice that we are again applying restricted rebut, although similar problems also occur
when applying unrestricted rebut
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Figure 5. Strict rules as classical logic can have side effects (complex example)
semantics) because John and Mary are having a disagreement about a cup of
coffee.
Before continuing to discuss some solutions that have been proposed in the
literature, it can be useful to first define what precisely is it that we are trying
to satisfy. Or, to put it in other words, what is the property that is actually
being violated in Example 3 and Example 4? For this, we follow the approach
of Caminada et al. [2012].
First of all, if DT = (P,Rd, n,≤) is a defeasible theory, then we write
Atoms(DT ) for the set of all propositional atoms occurring in DT . We say that
defeasible theories DT 1 and DT 2 are syntactically disjoint iff Atoms(DT1) ∩
Atoms(DT2) = ∅. For syntactically disjoint defeasible theories DT 1 = (P1,Rd1,
n1,≤1) and DT 2 = (P2,Rd2, n2,≤2) we define the union DT 1 ∪DT 2 as (P1 ∪
P2,Rd1 ∪ Rd2, n1 ∪ n2,≤1 ∪ ≤2). Also, given a defeasible theory DT , we de-
fine its consequences Cnσ(DT ) as {Concs(Args1}, . . . ,Concs(Argsn)} where
Args1, . . . ,Argsn are the extensions of arguments (under semantics σ) of the ar-
gumentation framework yielded by defeasible theory DT . Given a set of propo-
sitions S and a set of propositional atoms A, we define S|A as {ϕ ∈ S | each
atom in ϕ is an element of A}. Similarly, given a set S = {S1, . . . , Sn} where
each Si (i ∈ {1 . . . n}) is a set of propositions, we define S|A as {S1|A, . . . , Sn|A}.
Definition 10 An argumentation formalism (applying semantics σ) satisfies
non-interference iff for every pair of syntactically disjoint defeasible theories
DT 1 and DT 2 it holds that Cnσ(DT 1)|Atoms(DT1) = Cnσ(DT 1∪DT 2)|Atoms(DT1).
To see how non-interference can be violated, consider again Example 3.
In essence, the defeasible theory of this example can be seen as the union
of two syntactically disjoint defeasible theories DT 1 = (P1,Rd1, n1,≤1) and
DT 2 = (P2,Rd2, n2,≤2) with P1 = {wfr},Rd1 = {wfr ⇒ r}, P2 = {js,mns},
Rd2 = {js ⇒ s; mns ⇒ ¬s}, n1 = n2 = ∅ and ≤1=≤2= ∅. When applying
grounded semantics, it holds that Cngr(DT 1)|Atoms(DT1) = {{wfr, r}} whereas
Cngr(DT 1 ∪ DT 2)|Atoms(DT1) = {{wfr}}. So merging DT 1 with the com-
pletely unrelated defeasible theory DT 2 affects the outcome that is relevant
w.r.t. DT 1. Hence, non-interference is violated.
An even stronger property is that of crash resistance.
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Definition 11 A defeasible theory DT 1 = (P1,Rd1, n1,≤1) (with Atoms(DT 1)
( Atoms(L)) is called contaminating (under semantics σ) iff for each syntac-
tically disjoint defeasible theory DT 2 it holds that Cnσ(DT 1) = Cnσ(DT 1 ∪
DT 2). An argumentation formalism satisfies crash resistance iff there exists
no defeasible theory that is contaminating.
To see how crash resistance can be violated, consider Example 4. Again,
the defeasible theory of this example can be seen as the union of two syn-
tactically disjoint defeasible theories DT 1 = (P1,Rd1, n1,≤1) and DT 2 =
(P2,Rd2, n2,≤2) with P1 = {js,mns, junrel,munrel},Rd1 = {js⇒ s; mns⇒
¬s; junrel ⇒ ¬jrel; munrel ⇒ ¬mrel}, n1(js⇒ s) = n1(junrel ⇒ ¬jrel) =
jrel, n1(mns ⇒ ¬s) = n1(munrel ⇒ ¬mrel) = mrel, ≤1= ∅, P2 = {wfr},
Rd2 = {wfr ⇒ r}, n2 = ∅ and ≤2= ∅. When applying stable semantics, it
holds that Cnst(DT 1) = ∅, just like Cnst(DT 1∪DT 2) = ∅. Moreover, it can be
verified that for any DT ′2 that is syntactically disjoint with DT 1, it holds that
Cnst(DT 1∪DT ′2) = ∅, hence violating crash resistance under stable semantics.
Conceptually, the difference between non-interference and crash resistance is
as follows. A violation of non-interference means that a defeasible theory some-
how influences the entailment of a completely unrelated (syntactically disjoint)
defeasible theory when being merged to it. A violation of crash resistance is
more severe, as this means that a defeasible theory influences the entailment
of a completely unrelated (syntactically disjoint) defeasible theory to such an
extent that the actual contents of this other defeasible theory become totally
irrelevant. An argumentation formalism that satisfies non-interference also sat-
isfies crash resistance.17
Now that the relevant properties have been identified, we proceed to examine
some of the approaches in the literature for satisfying these. The first approach
to be discussed is that of Wu and Podlaszewski [2014]. Their main idea is
simply to erase inconsistent arguments18 from the argumentation framework
before applying argumentation semantics.
Definition 12 Let (Ar , def ) be the argumentation framework constructed from
defeasible theory DT (by applying restricted rebut). Let Ar c be {A ∈ Ar | A
is consistent } and let def c be def ∩ (Ar c ×Ar c). (Ar c, def c) is defined as the
inconsistency cleaned argumentation framework of DT .
As an example of how Definition 12 is used, in Example 3 and Example 4
argument A7 would be removed, as well as all attacks from and to A7. The
resulting inconsistency cleaned argumentation framework is such that r is a
conclusion of each complete extension.
One of the main results proved by Wu and Podlaszewski [2014] is that re-
moving inconsistent arguments from the argumentation framework does not
17That is, as long as the argumentation formalism is non-trivial in the sense of [Caminada
et al., 2012].
18An argument A is called inconsistent iff {Conc(A′) | A′ ∈ Sub(A)} is inconsistent.
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lead to any violations of direct consistency, closure and indirect consistency.19
They also prove that the properties of non-interference and crash resistance
are satisfied. However, the work of Wu and Podlaszewski [2014] assumes that
the strength ordering among the defeasible rules is the empty one, and they
provide an example of how their approach of erasing inconsistent arguments
violates consistency and closure when applying non-empty rule strengths in
combination with the last link principle.
The second approach to be discussed is that of Grooters and Prakken [2016].
Here, one of the basic ideas is to change the way strict rules are generated
from propositional logic. Instead of generating a strict rule ϕ1, . . . , ϕn → ϕ
whenever ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ` ϕ, they are generating such a strict rule only when from
some consistent set Φ ⊆ {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} it holds that Φ ` ϕ. So instead of the
strict rules coinciding with all propositional entailment, the idea is to have the
strict rules coinciding with consistent propositional entailment.
However, ruling out inconsistent inferences alone is not sufficient, as the
problem of ex falso quodlibet can also occur when successively applying several
strict inference steps, as was for instance observed earlier, using the rules s→
s ∨ r and s ∨ r,¬s → ¬r. The solution proposed by Grooters and Prakken
[2016] is simple: when constructing arguments, disallow the application of a
strict rule after the application of another strict rule.
It has to be mentioned that the approach of Grooters and Prakken [2016] has
not been proven to satisfy any of the properties of direct consistency, closure,
indirect consistency, non-interference and crash-resistance. Weaker properties
have been proven instead. We refer to [Grooters and Prakken, 2016] for details.
5 Discussion
It is important to observe that the properties examined in the current chapter
(sometimes called “rationality postulates” in the literature) are not specific
to argumentation theory. In fact, they are general properties that can be
applied to each formalism for non-monotonic reasoning that aims to encapsulate
some form of strict reasoning. This is why the notion of an argument is not
mentioned in the postulates of direct consistency, closure, indirect consistency,
non-interference and crash-resistance. Instead, these postulates are defined
purely based on the outcome (in terms of conclusions) of the argumentation
19This is unlike what for instance would happen when removing self-defeating (self-
undercutting) arguments, which can lead to violations of closure. As an example (free after
[Pollock, 1995]) take the argumentation system (Rs,Rd, n,≤) withRs = {→ a; b→ ¬c; c→
¬b}, Rd = {a ⇒ b}, n(a ⇒ b) = c and ≤= ∅. Here, we can construct arguments A1 :→ a,
A2 : A1 ⇒ b and A3 : A2 → ¬c. It holds that A3 defeats (undercuts) both itself and
A2. This yields a unique complete extension {A1} whose set of conclusions {a} satisfies
direct consistency, closure and indirect consistency. However, if one were to remove the self-
defeating argument A3, then this would yield a unique complete extension {A1, A2}, whose
set of conclusions {a, b} violates closure, as it contains b but not 6 c. The key point is that
whenever one removes a particular class of arguments from the argumentation framework
(be it inconsistent or self-attacking arguments) one has to examine whether this results in
any violations of direct consistency, indirect consistency and closure.
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formalism. That is, the postulates abstract from the notion of an argument.
This is not to say that no postulates have been formulated specifically about
the arguments yielded (instead of about the conclusions yielded). An example
of such a postulate would be subargument closure [Caminada and Amgoud,
2007]. This postulate says that if a particular extension contains argument
A, then it should also contain all subarguments of A (so each A′ ∈ Sub(A)).
Satisfying subargument closure is not difficult. From the definition of defeat
(under either restricted or unrestricted rebut) it follows that each argument
that attacks A′ also attacks A. So from A being in, say, a complete extension it
follows that A is defended against these attackers, so A′ is also being defended.
Therefore, A′ is also part of the complete extension (which contains everything
it defends).
In the current chapter, we have mainly focused on rule-based argumentation
formalisms, like aspic+. However, similar issues also play a role in classical
logic based argumentation [Gorogiannis and Hunter, 2011]. Here, the idea is,
given a set of propositions ∆ (called the knowledge base), to construct argu-
ments as pairs 〈Φ, ϕ〉 where ϕ is a proposition (called the conclusion) and Φ
is a set of propositions (called the assumptions) such that Φ ` ϕ, Φ 6` ⊥ and
¬∃φ ∈ Φ: Φ \ {φ} ` ϕ. Given this argument form, various ways of defining
the notion of defeat (or attack, as no strength order is taken into account) are
examined, especially for their ability to yield a consistent outcome. We refer
to the work of Gorogiannis and Hunter [2011] for details. While Gorogiannis
and Hunter [2011] do not consider use of preferences, a recent alternative for-
malisation of classical logic argumentation of D’Agostino and Modgil [2016]
satisfies the consistency and non-contamination postulates while supporting
the use of preferences. Moreover, this is done without the requirement that an
argument’s premises need to be checked for consistency and subset minimality,
and with the resulting argumentation frameworks only including finite subsets
of the arguments defined by a set of classical well-formed formulas. As such,
their theory provides a rational account that is suitable for resource bounded
agents.
One key point that we want to emphasise is that the satisfaction of rationality
postulates is not just a matter of theoretical elegance. If we were to apply
argumentation theory for practical purposes, to determine what should be the
actions to take, and our formalism tells us to put three people on a tandem
bicycle, then this advice will be of little use, as the actions to implement it
will fail. If we believe the world to be such that there exist some hard (non-
violatible) constraints, then it makes sense to model these using nondefeasible
(strict) rules and expect the argumentation formalism to deal with them in
a proper way. Similarly, if one were for instance to build a robot that uses
argumentation theory for its internal reasoning, what we would like to avoid is
the situation where after being fed some specific snippets of input (like John
whispering in its ear “The cup of coffee contains sugar, and I’m unreliable”,
and Mary whispering in its ear “The cup of coffee contains no sugar, and I’m
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unreliable”) all inference will come to a grinding halt, and the robot essentially
stops functioning. Hence, satisfaction of the rationality postulates is important
not just for theoretical elegance, but also to make the theory suitable for actual
applications.
Given the important role of rationality postulates when it comes to appli-
cations of argumentation theory, we observe that the current state of affairs
(at the time of writing) is somewhat unsatisfying. As for the postulates of di-
rect consistency, closure and indirect consistency, there seems to be a dilemma.
If, on one hand, one chooses to implement restricted rebut then these postu-
lates can be satisfied under any complete-based semantics. The disadvantage,
however, is that restricted rebut can be seen as unintuitive, especially in a di-
alectical context. If, on the other hand, one chooses to implement unrestricted
rebut, then the notion of defeat becomes more in line with natural discussion.
The disadvantage, however, is that one can only apply grounded semantics,
which tends to yield a very sceptical result. Moreover, satisfaction of the ra-
tionality postulates is only guaranteed if the strength order on the defeasible
rules is either empty or total (hence ruling out a proper partial oder).
As for the postulates of non-inferference and crash resistance, the situ-
ation is even more troublesome. First of all, all the approaches that we
are aware of [Wu, 2012; Wu and Podlaszewski, 2014; Podlaszewski, 2015;
Grooters and Prakken, 2016] work only with restricted rebut. Moreover, the
approach of Wu and Podlaszewski [2014] requires the empty ordering regard-
ing rule strength, whereas in many application domains different rules can have
different strengths. The work of Grooters and Prakken [2016], does allow for a
non-empty rule strength ordering, but fails to prove any of the forementioned
postulates, opting to prove much weaker properties instead.
Overall, when it comes to the development of formal argumentation theory,
one can observe that the topic of pure abstract argumentation tends to receive
quite some more research attention than the topic of instantiated argumen-
tation. Much work has for instance been done on how to select nodes from
a graph. However, the real challenge is how to select nodes from a graph in
a meaningful way, that is, such that the overall outcome makes sense from a
logical perspective so the conclusions could be relied upon regarding what to
do or what to believe. If formal argumentation is to be applied in situations
that matter, some proper solutions to the issue of rationality postulates would
be highly desirable.
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